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Abstract
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equilibrium model devised by the nineteenth century French economist Leon Walras (1834-1910) still
remains the fundamental paradigm that frames the way many economists think about this issue. Competitive
models directly adopt the paradigm. Imperfectly competitive models typically adopt the paradigm as a
benchmark of coordination success. Although often critiqued for its excessive abstraction and lack of
empirical salience, the paradigm has persisted.
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How should economists model the relationship between macroeconomic 
phenomena and microeconomic structure? Economists have been strug-
gling to answer this question for decades. Nevertheless, the Walrasian 
equilibrium model devised by the nineteenth century French economist 
Leon Walras (1834-1910) still remains the fundamental paradigm that 
frames the way many economists think about this issue. Competitive 
models directly adopt the paradigm. Imperfectly competitive models 
typically adopt the paradigm as a benchmark of coordination success. 
Although often critiqued for its excessive abstraction and lack of empirical 
salience, the paradigm has persisted. 
As detailed by Katzner (1989) and Takayama (1985), Walrasian equili-
brium in modern-day form is a precisely formulated set of conditions 
under which feasible allocations of goods and services can be price-
supported in an economic system organized on the basis of decentra-
lized markets with private ownership of productive resources. These 
conditions postulate the existence of a finite number of price-taking profit-
maximizing firms who produce goods and services of known type and 
quality, a finite number of consumers with exogenously determined 
preferences who maximize their utility of consumption taking prices 
and dividend payments as given, and a Walrasian Auctioneer (or equi-
valent clearinghouse construct) that determines prices to ensure each 
· With permission from Elsevier, this chapter is an abridged version of a study (Tesfatsion, 
2006) first presented in preliminary form at the Post Walrasian Macroeconomics 
Conference held at Middlebury College in May, 2004. 
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market clears. 1 Assuming consumer nonsatiation, the First Welfare 
Theorem guarantees that every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is 
Pareto efficient. 
The most salient structural characteristic of Walrasian equilibrium is 
its strong dependence on the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism, 
a coordination device that eliminates the possibility of strategic behavior. 
All agent interactions are passively mediated through payment systems; 
face-to-face personal interactions are not permitted. Prices and dividend 
payments constitute the only links among consumers and firms prior 
to actual trades. Since consumers take prices and dividend payments 
as given aspects of their decision problems, outside of their control, their 
decision problems reduce to simple optimization problems with no per-
ceived dependence on the actions of other agents. A similar observation 
holds for the decision problems faced by the price-taking firms. The equili-
brium values for the linking price and dividend variables are determined 
by market clearing conditions imposed through the Walrasian Auctioneer 
pricing mechanism; they are not determined by the actions of consumers, 
firms, or any other agency supposed to actually reside within the economy. 
What happens in a standard Walrasian equilibrium model if the 
Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism is removed and if prices and 
quantities are instead required to be set entirely through the actions of the 
firms and consumers themselves? Not surprisingly, this "small" perturba-
tion of the Walrasian model turns out to be anything but small. Even a 
minimalist attempt to complete the resulting model leads to analytical 
difficulty or even intractability. As elaborated by numerous commenta-
tors, the modeler must now come to grips with challenging issues such 
as asymmetric information, strategic interaction, expectation formation on 
the basis of limited information, mutual learning, social norms, transaction 
costs, externalities, market power, predation, collusion, and the possibility 
of coordination failure (convergence to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium). 2 
The prevalence of market protocols, rationing rules, antitrust legislation, 
and other types of institutions in real-world macroeconomies is now better 
1 The colorful term " Walrasian Auctioneer" was first introduced by Leijonhufvud (1967). 
He explains the origins of the term as follows (personal correspondence, May 10, 2004): " I 
had come across this statement by Norbert Weiner, made in the context of explaining 
Maxwell 's Demon to a lay audience, to the effect that 'in the physics of our grandfathers' 
information was costless. So I anthropomorphized the tatonnement process to get a 
Walras's Demon to match Maxwell's." 
2 See, for example, Akerlof (2002), Albin and l'olcy ( 1992), Arrow (1987), l3owles and 
Gintis (2000), Clower and Howitt (1996), Colander (1996), l'ciwel (1985), Hoover (1992), 
Howitt ( 1990), Kinnan ( 1997), Klernpercr (2002a,b), and Leijonhufvud ( 1996). 
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understood as a potentially critical scaffolding needed to ensure orderly 
economJC process. 
Over time, increasingly sophisticated tools are permitting macroeco-
nomic modelers to incorporate more compelling representations for the 
public and private methods governing production, pricing, trade, and 
settlement activities in real-world macroeconomies. Some of these tools 
involve advances in logical deduction and some involve advances in 
. 1 3 computat10na power. 
This essay provides an introductory discussion of a potentially fruitful 
computational development for the study of macroeconomic systems, 
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Exploiting the growing 
capabilities of computers, ACE is the computational study of economic 
processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents.4 Here "agent" 
refers broadly to bundled data and behavioral methods representing an 
entity constituting part of a computationally constructed world. Examples 
of possible agents include individuals (e.g. consumers, workers), social 
groupings (e.g. families, firms, government agencies), institutions (e.g. 
markets, regulatory systems), biological entities (e.g. crops, livestock, 
forests) , and physical entities (e.g. infrastructure, weather, and geographical 
regions) . Thus, agents can range from active data-gathering decision-
makers with sophisticated learning capabilities to passive world features 
with no cognitive functioning. Moreover, agents can be composed of other 
agents, thus permitting hierarchical constructions. For example, a firm 
might be composed of workers and managers. 5 
3 See, for example, Albin (1998), Anderson et al. (1988), Arifovic (2000), Arthur et al. 
(1997), Axelrod (1997), Brock et al. (1991), Clark (1997), Day and Chen ( 1993), 
Durlauf and Young (2001), Evans and Honkapohja (2001 ), Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), 
Gintis (2000), Judd (1998), Krugman (1996), Mirowski (2004), Nelson (1995), Nelson and 
Winter {1982), Prescott (1996), Roth (2002), Sargent {1993), Schelling ( 1978) , Shubik 
(1991), Simon (1982), Witt (1993), and Young (1998). 
4 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace. htm for extensive online resources related to 
ACE, including readings, course materials, software, toolkits, demos, and pointers to 
individual researchers and research groups. A diverse sampling of ACE research can be 
found in Leombruni and Richiardi (2004) and in Tesfatsion (200la,b,c). For surveys and 
other introductory materials, see Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006), Batten (2000), Epstein 
and Axtell (I 996) , Tesfatsion (2002), and Tesfatsion and Judd (2006). 
5 A person familiar with object-oriented programming (OOP) might wonder why "agent" 
is used here instead of"object," or "object template" (class), since both agents and objects 
refer to computational entities that package together data and functionality and support 
inheritance and composition. Following Jennings (2000) and other agent-oriented 
programmers, "agent" is used to stress the intended application to problem domains that 
include entities capable of varying degrees of self-governance and self-directed social 
interactions. In contrast, OOP has traditionally interpreted objects as passive tools in the 
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The first section of this essay explains more fully the basic ACE methodo-
logy. The second section starts by setting out a relatively simple Walrasian 
equilibrium model for a two-sector decentralized market economy. The 
Walrasian Auctioneer is then removed from this model, and the circular 
flow between firms and consumers is reestablished through the introduction 
of agent-driven procurement processes. The resulting "ACE Trading 
World" is used in the following section to illustrate how ACE modeling 
tools facilitate the provision of empirically compelling microfoundations for 
macroeconomic systems. Concluding remarks are given in the final section. 
THE BASIC ACE METHODOLOGY 
A system is typically defined to be complex if it exhibits the following two 
properties (for example, see Flake [ 19981): 
• The system is composed of interacting units; 
• The system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from 
the interactions of the units that are not properties of the individual units 
themselves. 
Agreement on the definition of a complex adaptive system has proved to 
be more difficult to achieve. The range of possible definitions offered by 
commentators includes the following three nested characterizations: 
Definition 1: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that 
includes reactive units, that is, units capable of exhibiting systematically 
different attributes in reaction to changed environmental conditions.6 
Definition 2: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that 
includes goal-directed units, that is, units that are reactive and that direct 
at least some of their reactions towards the achievement of built-in 
(or evolved) goals. 
service of some specific task. Consider, for example, the following description from the 
well -known Java text by Eckel (2003): "One of the best ways to think about objects is as 
'service providers.' Your goal is to produce ... a set of objects that provides the ideal 
services to solve your problem." 
6 For example, this definition includes simple Darwinian systems for which each unit 
has a rigidly structured behavioral rule as wel l as a "fitness" attribute measuring the 
performance of this unit relative to the average performance of other units in the current 
unit population. A unit ceases to function if it has sufficiently low fitness; otherwise it 
reproduces (makes copies of itself) in proportion to its fitness . If the initial unit population 
exhibits diverse behaviors across units, then the fitness attribute of each unit will change 
systematically in response to changes in the composition of the unit population . 
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Definition 3: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that 
includes planner units, that is, units that are goal-directed and that attempt 
to exert some degree of control over their environment to facilitate 
achievement of these goals. 
The ACE methodology is a culture-dish approach to the study of 
economic systems viewed as complex adaptive systems in the sense of 
Definition l, at a minimum, and often in the stronger sense of Definition 2, 
or Definition 3. As in a culture-dish laboratory experiment, the ACE 
modeler starts by computationally constructing an economic world 
comprising multiple interacting agents (units). The modeler then steps 
back to observe the development of the world over time. 
The agents in an ACE model can include economic entities as well as 
social, biological, and physical entities (e.g. families, crops, and weather). 
Each agent is an encapsulated piece of software that includes data together 
with behavioral methods that act on these data. Some of these data and 
methods are designated as publicly accessible to all other agents, some are 
designated as private and hence not accessible by any other agents, and 
some are designated as protected from access by all but a specified subset 
of other agents. Agents can communicate with each other through their 
public and protected methods. 
The ACE modeler specifies the initial state of an economic system by 
specifying each agent's initial data and behavioral methods and the degree 
of accessibility of these data and methods to other agents. As illustrated in 
Tables 9.1-9.4, an agent's data might include its type attribute (e.g. world, 
market, firm, consumer), its structural attributes (e.g. geography, design, 
cost function, utility function), and information about the attributes 
of other agents (e.g. addresses). An agent's methods can include socially 
instituted public behavioral methods (e.g. antitrust laws, market protocols) 
as well as private behavioral methods. Examples of the latter include 
production and pricing strategies, learning algorithms for updating 
strategies, and methods for changing methods (e.g. methods for switching 
from one learning algorithm to another). The resulting ACE model must 
be dynamically complete. As illustrated in Table 9.5, this means the 
modeled economic system must be able to develop over time solely on the 
basis of agent interactions, without further interventions from the modeler. 
In the real world, all calculations have real cost consequences because 
they must be carried out by some agency actually residing in the world. 
ACE modeling forces the modeler to respect this constraint. An ACE model 
is essentially a collection of algorithms (procedures) that have been 
encapsulated into the methods of software entities called "agents." 
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Table 9.1. A computational world 
agent World 
{ 
Public Access: 
//Public Methods 
The World Event Schedule, a system clock permitting World inhabitants to 
time and order their activities (method activations), including 
synchronized activities such as offer posting and trade; 
Protocols governing the ownership of stock shares; 
Protocols governing collusion among firms; 
Protocols governing the insolvency of firms; 
Methods for retrieving stored World data; 
Methods for receiving data. 
Private Access: 
//Private Methods 
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data. 
//Private Data 
World attributes (e.g. spatial configuration); 
World inhabitants (e.g. markets, firms, consumers); 
Attributes and methods of the World's inhabitants; 
History of World events; 
Address book (communication links); 
Recorded communications. 
Algorithms encapsulated into the methods of a particular agent can only 
be implemented using the particular information, reasoning tools, time, 
and physical resources available to that agent. This encapsulation into 
agents is done in an attempt to achieve a more transparent and realistic 
representation of real-world systems involving multiple distributed entities 
with limited information and computational capabilities. 
Current ACE research divides roughly into four strands differentiated by 
objective.7 One primary objective is empirical understanding: why have 
particular global regularities evolved and persisted despite the absence of 
centralized planning and control? ACE researchers pursuing this objective 
seek causal explanations grounded in the repeated interactions of agents 
7 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aapplic.htm for pointers to resource sites for a 
variety of ACE research areas, including a site on multi-market modeling and 
macroeconomics. 
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Table 9.2. A computational market 
agent Market 
I 
Public Access: 
//Public Methods 
getWorldE ventSchedule( clocktime); 
Protocols governing the public posting of supply offers; 
Protocols governing the price discovery process; 
Protocols governing the trading process; 
Methods for retrieving stored Market data; 
Methods for receiving data. 
Private Access: 
// Private Methods 
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data. 
//Private Data 
Information about firms (e.g. posted supply offers); 
Information about consumers (e.g. bids); 
Address book (communication links); 
Recorded communications. 
operating in realistically rendered worlds. Ideally, the agents should have the 
same flexibility of action in their worlds as their corresponding entities have 
in the real world. In particular, the cognitive agents should be free to behave 
in accordance with their own beliefs, preferences, institutions, and physical 
circumstances without the external imposition of equilibrium conditions. 
The key issue is whether particular types of observed global regularities 
can be reliably generated from particular types of agent-based worlds, what 
Epstein and Axtell (1996) refer to as the "generative" approach to science. 
A second primary objective is normative understanding: how can agent-
based models be used as computational laboratories for the discovery of good 
economic designs? ACE researchers pursuing this objective are interested 
in evaluating whether designs proposed for economic policies, institutions, 
and processes will result in socially desirable system performance over time. 
The general approach is akin to filling a bucket with water to determine 
if it leaks. An agent-based world is constructed that captures the salient 
aspects of an economic system operating under the design. The world is then 
populated with privately motivated agents with learning capabilities and 
allowed to develop over time. The key issue is the extent to which the 
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Table 9.3. A computational firm 
agent Firm 
I 
Public Access: 
//Public Methods 
getW orldEventSchedule( clocktime); 
getWorldProtocol(ownership of stock shares); 
getWorldProtocol(collusion among firms); 
getWorldProtocol(insolvency of firms); 
getMarketProtocol(posting of supply offers); 
getMarketProtocol(trading process); 
Methods for retrieving stored Firm data; 
Methods for receiving data. 
Private Access: 
//Private Methods 
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data; 
Method for selecting my supply offers; 
Method for rationing my customers; 
Method for recording my sales; 
Method for calculating my profits; 
Method for a llocating my profits to my shareholders; 
Method for calculating my net worth; 
Methods for changing my methods. 
//Private Data 
My money holdings, capacity, total cost function, and net worth; 
Information about the structure of the World; 
Information about World events; 
Address book (communication links ); 
Recorded communications. 
resulting world outcomes are efficient, fair, and orderly, despite attempts 
by agents to gain individual advantage through strategic behavior. 
A third primary objective is qualitative insight and theory generation: 
how can economic systems be more fully understood through a systematic 
examination of their potential dynamic behaviors under alternatively 
specified initial conditions? Such understanding would help to clarify not 
only why certain global outcomes have regularly been observed, but also 
why others have not. 
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Table 9.4. A computational consumer 
agent Consumer 
1 
Public Access: 
//Public Methods 
getW orldEventSchedule( clocktime); 
getWorldProtocol(ownership of stock shares); 
getMarketProtocol(price discovery process); 
getMarketProtocol (trading process); 
Methods for retrieving stored Consumer data; 
Methods for receiving data. 
Private Access: 
//Private Methods 
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data; 
Method for determining my budget constraint; 
Method for determining my demands; 
Method for seeking feasible and desirable supply offers; 
Method for recording my purchases; 
Method for calculating my utility; 
Methods for changing my methods. 
//Private Data 
My money holdings, subsistence needs, and utility function; 
Information about the structure of the World; 
Information about World events; 
Address book (communication links); 
Recorded communications. 
A fourth primary objective is methodological advancement: how best to 
provide ACE researchers with the methods and tools they need to 
undertake systematic theoretical studies of economic systems through 
controlled computational experiments, and to validate experimentally 
generated theories against real-world data? ACE researchers are exploring 
a variety of ways to address this objective ranging from careful consi-
deration of methodological principles to the practical development of 
programming, visualization, and validation tools. 
ACE can be applied to a broad spectrum of economic systems ranging 
from micro to macro in scope. This application has both advantages and 
disadvantages relative to more standard modeling approaches. 
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Table 9.5. World dynamic activity flow 
main () l 
initWorld(); 
configWorld(); 
For (T=O, ... ,Tmax) ! 
postOffers(); 
seek Offers(); 
match(); 
trade(); 
update(); 
//Construct a world composed of agents 
//(markets, firms, consumers, ... ). 
//Configure the world and its constituent 
//agents with methods and data. 
//Enter the World Event Schedule: 
//Firms select supply offers and 
//publicly post them. 
//Consumers seek supply offers in accordance 
//with their needs and preferences. 
//Firms and consumers determine trade 
//Partners and record transaction costs. 
//Firms and consumers engage in trade 
//interactions and record trade outcomes. 
//Firms and consumers update their methods 
//and data based on their search and trade 
11 experiences. 
On the plus side, as in industrial organization theory (Tirole [ 2003]), 
agents in ACE models can be represented as interactive goal-directed 
entities, strategically aware of both competitive and cooperative possibilities 
with other agents. As in the extensive-form market game work of 
researchers such as Albin and Foley (1992), Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1990), and Shubik (1991), market protocols and other institutions 
constraining agent interactions can constitute important explicit aspects 
of the modeled economic processes. As in the behavioral game theory work 
of researchers such as Camerer ( 2003), agents can learn, that is, change 
their behavior based on previous experience; and this learning can be 
calibrated to what actual people are observed to do in real-world or 
controlled laboratory settings. Moreover, as in work by Gintis (2000) that 
blends aspects of evolutionary game theory with cultural evolution, the 
beliefs, preferences, behaviors, and interaction patterns of the agents can 
vary endogenously over time. 
One key departure of ACE modeling from more standard approaches is 
that events are driven solely by agent interactions once initial conditions 
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have been specified. Thus, rather than focusing on the equilibrium states of 
a system, the idea is to watch and see if some form of equilibrium develops 
over time. The objective is to acquire a better understanding of a system's 
entire phase portrait, that is, all possible equilibria together with corres-
ponding basins of attraction. An advantage of this focus on process rather 
than on equilibrium is that modeling can proceed even if equilibria are 
computationally intractable or nonexistent. 
A second key departure presenting a potential advantage is the increased 
facility provided by agent-based tools for agents to engage in flexible social 
communication. This means that agents can communicate with other 
agents at event-driven times using messages that they, themselves, have 
adaptively scripted. 
However, it is frequently claimed that the most important advantage 
of ACE modeling relative to more standard modeling approaches is that 
agent-based tools facilitate the design of agents with relatively more 
autonomy; see Jennings (2000). Autonomy, for humans, means a capacity 
for self-governance.8 What does it mean for computational agents? 
Here is how an "autonomous agent" is defined by a leading expert in 
artificial intelligence, Stan Franklin ( l 997a): 
An autonomous agent is a system situated within and part of an environment that 
senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and 
so as to effect what it senses in the future. 
Clearly the standard neoclassical budget-constrained consumer who 
selects a sequence of purchases to maximize her expected lifetime utility 
could be said to satisfy this definition in some sense. Consequently, the 
important issue is not whether agent-based tools permit the modeling of 
agents with autonomy. per se, but rather the degree to which they usefully 
facilitate the modeling of agents exhibiting substantially more autonomy 
than permitted by standard modeling approaches. 
What degree of agent autonomy. then, do agent-based tools permit? In 
any purely mathematical model, including any ACE model in which agents 
do not have access to "true" random numbers,9 the actions of an agent are 
ultimately determined by the conditions of the agent's world at the time of 
8 See the "Personal Autonomy" entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site. 
accessible at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/. 
9 Agent-based modelers can now replace deterministically generated pseudo-random 
numbers with random numbers generated by real-world processes such as atmospheric 
noise and radioactive decay; for example, see http://www.random.org. This development 
has potentially interesting philosoph ical ramifications. 
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the agent's conception. A fundamental issue, dubbed the First AI Debate by 
Franklin (1997b), is whether or not the same holds true for humans. 
In particular, is Penrose (1989) correct when he eloquently argues there 
is something fundamentally noncomputational about human thought, 
something that intrinsically prevents the algorithmic representation of 
human cognitive and social behaviors? 
Lacking a definitive answer to this question, ACE researchers argue more 
pragmatically that agent-based tools facilitate the modeling of cognitive 
agents with more realistic social and learning capabilities (hence more 
autonomy) than one finds in traditional Homo economicus. As suggested 
in Tables 9.3-9.4, these capabilities include: social communication skills; 
the ability to learn about one's environment from various sources, such as 
gathered information, past experiences, social mimicry, and deliberate 
experimentation with new ideas; the ability to form and maintain social 
interaction patterns (e.g. trade networks); the ability to develop shared 
perceptions (e.g. commonly accepted market protocols); the ability to 
alter beliefs and preferences as an outcome of learning; and the ability to 
exert at least some local control over the timing and type of actions taken 
within the world in an attempt to satisfy built in (or evolved) needs, drives, 
and goals. A potentially important aspect of all of these modeled 
capabilities is that they can be based in part on the internal processes of 
an agent, that is, on the agent's private methods, which are hidden from 
the view of all other entities residing in the agent's world. This effectively 
renders an agent both unpredictable and uncontrollable relative to its 
world. 
In addition, as indicated in Tables 9.3-9.4, an agent can introduce 
structural changes in its methods over time on the basis of experience. For 
example, it can have a method for systematically introducing structural 
changes in its current learning method so that it learns to learn over time. 
Thus, agents can socially construct distinct persistent personalities. 
Agent-based tools also facilitate the modeling of social and biological 
aspects of economic systems thought to be important for autonomous 
behavior that go beyond the aspects reflected in Tables 9. l-9.5. For 
example, agents can be represented as embodied (e.g. sighted) entities with 
the ability to move from place to place in general spatial landscapes. Agents 
can also be endowed with "genomes" permitting the study of economic 
systems with genetically-based reproduction and with evolution of 
biological populations. For extensive discussion and illustration of agent-
based models incorporating such features, see Belew and Mitchell (1996), 
Epstein and Axtell ( l 996), and Holland ( l 995). 
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What are the disadvantages of ACE relative to more standard 
modeling approaches? One drawback is that ACE modeling requires the 
construction of dynamically complete economic models. That is, starting 
from initial conditions, the model must permit and fully support the 
playing out of agent interactions over time without further interven-
tion from the modeler. This completeness requires detailed initial 
specifications for agent data and methods determining structural attributes, 
institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions. If agent interac-
tions induce sufficiently strong positive feedbacks, small changes in these 
initial specifications could radically affect the types of outcomes that 
result. Consequently, intensive experimentation must often be conducted 
over a wide array of plausible initial specifications for ACE models if 
robust prediction is to be achieved. ' 0 Moreover, it is not clear how well 
ACE models will be able to scale up to provide empirically and practically 
useful models of large-scale systems with many thousands of agents. 
Another drawback is the difficulty of validating ACE model outcomes 
against empirical data. ACE experiments generate outcome distributions 
for theoretical economic systems with explicitly articulated microfounda-
tions. Often these outcome distributions have a multipeaked form sugges-
ting multiple equilibria rather than a central-tendency form permitting 
simple point predictions. In contrast, the real world is a single time-series 
realization arising from a poorly understood data generating process. Even 
if an ACE model were to accurately embody this real-world data generating 
process, it might be impossible to verify this accuracy using standard 
statistical procedures. For example, an empirically observed outcome might 
be a low-probability event lying in a relatively small peak of the outcome 
distribution for this true data-generating process, or in a thin tail of this 
distribution. 
FROM WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM 
TO ACE TRADING 
For concrete illustration, this section first presents m summary form 
a Walrasian equilibrium modeling of a simple two-sector economy with 
price-taking firms and consumers. The Walrasian Auctioneer pricing 
mechanism is then removed, resulting in a dynamically incomplete 
economy. Specifically, the resulting economy has no processes for deter-
mining how production and price levels are set, how buyers are to 
10 This point is discussed at some length by Judd (2006). 
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be matched with sellers, and how goods are to be distributed from sellers 
to buyers in cases in which matching fails to result in market clearing. 
One possible way to complete the economy with agent-driven pro-
curement processes is then outlined, resulting in an ACE Trading World. 11 
The completion is minimal in the sense that only procurement processes 
essential for re-establishing the underlying circular flow between firms 
and consumers are considered. As will be elaborated more carefully below, 
these processes include firm learning methods for production and pricing, 
firm profit allocation methods, firm rationing methods, and consumer 
price discovery methods. 
In the ACE Trading World, firms that fail to cover their costs risk 
insolvency and consumers who fail to provide for their subsistence needs, 
face death. Consequently, the adequacy of the procurement processes used 
by these firms and consumers determines whether they survive and even 
prosper over time. The critical role played by procurement processes in the 
ACE Trading World highlights in concrete terms the extraordinarily 
powerful role played by the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism in 
standard Walrasian equilibrium models. 
Walrasian Bliss in a Hash-and-Beans Economy 
Consider the following Walrasian equilibrium modeling of a simple 
one-period economy with two production sectors. The economy is 
populated by a finite number of profit-seeking firms producing hash, 
a finite number of profit-seeking firms producing beans, and a finite 
number of consumers who derive utility from the consumption of hash 
and beans. Each firm has a total cost function expressing its produc-
tion costs as a function of its output level. Each consumer is endowed with 
an equal ownership share in each firm as well as an exogenous money 
income. 
At the beginning of the period, each firm has expectations for the price 
of hash and the price of beans. Conditional on these price expectations, the 
firm selects a production level to maximize its profits. The solution to this 
profit-maximizing problem gives the optimal output supply for the firm as 
a function of its price expectations and its cost function. At the end of the 
period, all firm profits are distributed back to consumers as dividends in 
proportion to their ownership shares. 
11 A detailed technical presentation of the ACE Trading World can he found in Tesfatsion 
(2006). 
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At the beginning of the period, each consumer has expectations 
regarding the dividends she will receive back from each firm, as well as 
expectations for the price of hash and the price of beans. Conditional on 
these expectations, the consumer chooses hash and bean demands to 
maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint. This budget 
constraint takes the following form: the expected value of planned 
expenditures must be less than or equal to expected total income. The 
solution to this utility maximization problem gives the optimal hash and 
bean demands for the consumer as a function of her dividend expectations, 
her price expectations, her tastes (utility function), and her exogenous 
money income. 
Definition: A specific vector e* comprising each consumer's demands 
for hash and beans, each firm's supply of hash or beans, non-negative 
prices for hash and beans, expected prices for hash and beans, and 
consumer expected dividends is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium if the 
following four conditions hold: 
(a) Individual Optimality. At e*, all consumer demands are optimal 
demands conditional on consumer expected prices and consumer 
expected dividends, and all firm supplies are optimal supplies 
conditional on firm expected prices. 
(b) Correct Expectations: At e*, all expected prices coincide with 
actual prices, and all expected dividends coincide with actual 
dividends calculated as consumer shares of actual firm profits. 
(c) Market Clearing. At e*, aggregate supply is greater than or equal 
to aggregate demand in both the market for hash and the market 
for beans. 
(d) Walras' Law (Strong Form): Ate*, the total value of excess supply 
is zero; that is, the total value of all demands for hash and beans 
equals the total value of all supplies of hash and beans. 
Conditions (c) and (d) together imply that any consumption good in 
excess supply at e* must have a zero price. If consumers are nonsatiated at 
e*, meaning they would demand more of at least one type of good if their 
incomes were to increase, their budget constraints must be binding on their 
purchases ate*. Given nonsatiation together with conditions (a) and (b), a 
summation of all consumer budget constraints would then reveal that the 
total value of excess supply must necessarily be exactly zero at e*, that is, 
Walras' Law in the strong sense of condition (d) necessarily holds. Finally, 
given consumer nonsatiation together with conditions (a) through (c), the 
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First Welfare Theorem ensures that any hash and bean consumption levels 
supportable as optimal consumer demands under a Walrasian equilibrium 
will be a Pareto efficient consumption allocation (see Takayama [ 1985]). 
Plucking Out the Walrasian Auctioneer 
The fulfillment of conditions (b) through ( d) in the above definition of 
Walrasian equilibrium effectively defines the task assigned to the Walrasian 
Auctioneer. This task has three distinct aspects, assumed costless to 
achieve. First, all prices must be set at market clearing levels conditional on 
firm and consumer expectations. Second, all firms must have correct price 
expectations and all consumers must have correct price and dividend 
expectations. Third, consumers must be appropriately matched with firms 
to ensure an efficient set of trades. 
To move from Walrasian to agent-based modeling, the Walrasian 
Auctioneer has to be replaced by agent-driven procurement processes. This 
replacement is by no means a small perturbation of the model. Without the 
Walrasian Auctioneer, the following types of agent-enacted methods are 
minimally required in order to maintain a circular flow between firms 
and consumers over time: 
Terms of Trade: Firms must determine how their price and production 
levels will be set. 
Seller-Buyer Matching: Firms and consumers must engage in a matching 
process that puts potential sellers in contact with potential buyers. 
Rationing: Firms and consumers must have procedures in place to 
handle excess demands or supplies arising from the matching process. 
Trade: Firms and consumers must carry out actual trades. 
Settlement: Firms and consumers must settle their payment obligations. 
Shake-Out: Firms that become insolvent and consumers who fail to 
satisfy their subsistence consumption needs must exit the economy. 
Attention thus shifts from firms and consumers optimizing in isolation, 
conditional on expected prices and dividends, to the interaction patterns 
occurring among firms and consumers over time as they attempt to carry 
out their trading activities. 
The ACE Trading World outlined below illustrates one possible 
completion of the hash-and-beans economy with procurement handled 
by the agents themselves rather than by a Walrasian Auctioneer. 
The resulting process model is described at each point in time by the 
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configuration of data and methods across all agents. A partial listing of 
these data and methods is schematically indicated in Tables 9. l-9.4. As 
indicated in Table 9.5, all outcomes in the ACE Trading World are 
generated through firm and consumer interactions played out within the 
constraints imposed by currently prevalent structural conditions and 
institutional arrangements; market clearing conditions are not imposed. 
Consequently, in order to survive and even prosper in their world, the 
firms and consumers must learn to coordinate their behaviors over time in 
an appropriate manner. 
The ACE Trading W odd 
Consider an economy that runs during periods T = 0, l, ... ,TMax. At the 
beginning of the initial period T = 0, the economy is populated by a finite 
number of profit-seeking hash firms, a finite number of profit-seeking bean 
firms, and a finite number of consumers who derive utility from the 
consumption of hash and beans. 
Each firm in period T= 0 starts with a non-negative amount of money 
and a positive production capacity (size). Each firm has a total cost 
function that includes amortized fixed costs proportional to its current 
capacity. Each firm knows the number of hash firms, bean firms, and 
consumers currently in the economy, and each firm knows that hash and 
beans are perishable goods that last at most one period. However, no firm 
has prior knowledge regarding the income levels and utility functions of 
the consumers or the cost functions and capacities of other firms. Explicit 
collusion among firms is prohibited by antitrust laws. 
Each consumer in period T = 0 has a lifetime money endowment profile 
and a utility function measuring preferences and subsistence needs for 
hash and beans consumption in each period. Each consumer is also a 
shareholder who owns an equal fraction of each hash and bean firm . The 
income of each consumer at the beginning of period T = 0 is entirely 
determined by his/her money endowment. At the beginning of each sub-
sequent period, each consumer's income is determined in part by his/her 
money endowment, in part by his/her savings from previous periods, and 
in part by his/her newly received dividend payments from firms. 
At the beginning of each period T :2:: 0, each firm selects a supply offer 
consisting of a production level and a unit price. Each firm uses a learning 
method to make this selection, conditional on its profit history and its cost 
attributes. The basic question posed is as follows: Given I have earned 
particular profits in past periods using particular selected supply offers, 
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how should this affect my selection of a supply offer in the current 
period? Each firm immediately posts its selected supply offer in an attempt 
to attract consumers. This posting is carried out simultaneously by 
all firms, so that no firm has a strategic advantage through asymmetric 
information. 
At the beginning of each period T ~ 0, each consumer costlessly acquires 
complete information about the firms ' supply offers as soon as they are 
posted. Consumers then attempt to ensure their survival and happiness by 
engaging in a price discovery process consisting of successive rounds. During 
each round, the following sequence of activities is carried out. First, any 
consumer unable to cover his/her currently unmet subsistence needs at the 
currently lowest posted prices immediately exits the price discovery 
process. Each remaining consumer determines his/her utility-maximizing 
demands for hash and beans conditional on his/her currently unspent 
income, his/her currently unmet subsistence needs, and the currently 
lowest posted hash and bean prices. He/she then submits his/her demands 
to the firms that have posted these lowest prices. Next, the firms receiving 
these demands attempt to satisfy them, applying if necessary a rationing 
method. Consumers rationed below subsistence need for one of the goods 
can adjust downward their demand for the remaining good to preserve 
income for future rounds. Finally, actual trades take place, which concludes 
the round. Any firms with unsold goods and any rationed consumers with 
unspent income then proceed into the next round, and the process repeats. 
This period-T price-discovery process comes to a halt either when all 
firms are stocked out or when the unspent income levels of all consumers 
still participating in the process have been reduced to zero. Consumers 
who exit or finish this process with positive unmet subsistence needs die 
at the end of period T. Their unspent money holdings (if any) are then 
lost to the economy, but their stock shares are distributed equally among 
all remaining (alive) consumers at the beginning of period T + l. This 
stock share redistribution method ensures that each alive consumer 
continues to own an equal share of each firm. At the end of each period 
T;:::, 0, each firm calculates its period-T profits. A firm incurs positive 
(negative) profits if it sells (does not sell) enough output at a sufficiently 
high price to cover its total costs, including its fixed costs. Each firm then 
calculates its period-T net worth (total assets minus total liabilities) . If 
a firm finds it does not have a positive net worth, 12 it is declared effectively 
12 As detailed in Tesfatsion (2006, Appendix), a valuation of each firm's capacity is 
included in the calculation of its net worth. Consequently, a zero net worth implies a firm 
has no capacity for production. 
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insolvent and it must exit the economy. Otherwise, the firm applies a state-
conditioned profit allocation method to determine how its period- T profits 
(positive or negative) should be allocated between money (dis)savings, 
capacity (dis)investment, and (non-negative) dividend payments to its 
shareholders. 
In summary, the ACE Trading World incorporates several key 
structural attributes, institutional arrangements, and behavioral 
methods whose specification could critically affect model outcomes. 
These include: initial numbers and capacities of hash and bean firms; 
initial number of consumers; initial firm money holdings; consumer 
money endowment profiles; initial firm cost functions; consumer utility 
functions; market price discovery and trading protocols; world protocols 
regarding stock ownership, firm collusion, and firm insolvency; firm 
learning methods; firm rationing methods; and firm profit allocation 
methods. 
The degree to which the ACE Trading World is capable of self-
coordination can be experimentally examined by studying the impact of 
changes in these specifications on micro behaviors, interaction patterns, 
and global regularities. For example, as detailed in Cook and Tesfatsion 
(2006), the ACE Trading World is being implemented as a computa-
tional laboratory with a graphical user interface. This implementation 
will permit users to explore systematically the effects of alternative 
specifications, and to visualize these effects through various types of run-
time displays. 
Defining "Equilibrium" for the ACE Trading World 
Definitions of equilibrium appearing in scientific discourse differ m 
particulars depending on the system under study. All such definitions, 
however, would appear to embody the following core idea: a system is in 
equilibrium if all influences acting on the system offset each other so that 
the system is in an unchanging condition. 
It is important to note the absence in this core definition of any 
conception of uniqueness, optimality, or stability (robustness) with regard 
to external system disturbances. Once the existence of an equilibrium has 
been established, one can further explore the particular nature of this 
equilibrium. Is it unique? Does it exhibit optimality properties in any 
sense? Is it locally stable with respect to displacements confined to some 
neighborhood of the equilibrium? If so, what can be said about the size 
and shape of this "basin of attraction"? 
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The ACE Trading World is a deterministic system. 13 The state of 
the system at the beginning of each period T is given by the methods and 
data of all of the agents currently constituting the system. The methods 
include all of the processes used by agents in period T to carry out 
production, price, trade, and settlement activities, both private behavioral 
methods and public protocols. These methods are schematically indicated 
in Tables 9.1-9.4 and presented in detail in Tesfatsion (2006) . The data 
include all of the exogenous and period- T predetermined variables for the 
ACE Trading World; a complete listing of these variables is provided in 
Tesfatsion (2006). 
Let X( T) denote the state of the ACE Trading World at the beginning of 
period T. By construction, the motion of this state follows a first-order 
Markov process. That is, X( T + l) is determined as a function of the 
previous state X(T). This function would be extremely difficult to represent 
in explicit structural form, but it could be done. 14 For expository purposes, 
let this state process be depicted as 
X(T+l) = S(X(T)), T = 0,1, .. . , TMax. (1) 
If in some period j· '.:::: 0, all firms were to become insolvent and all 
consumers were to die for lack of goods sufficient to meet their subsistence 
needs, the ACE Trading World would exhibit an " unchanging condition" 
in the sense of an unchanged state, 
X(T +I)= X(T) for T = T + 1, ... , TMax. (2) 
Apart from this dire situation, however, the ACE Trading World has 
four features that tend to promote continual changes in the data 
components of X( T): (a) the firms' use of choice probability distributions 
to select supply offers; (b) firm learning (updating of choice probability 
distributions); (c) changing firm capacity levels in response to changing 
profit conditions; and (d) resort by firms and consumers to "coin flips" 
to resolve indifferent choices. Consequently, although a stationary-state 
13 Each firm and consumer in the ACE Trad ing World implementation by Cook and 
Tesfatsion (2006) has access to its own method for generating "random numbers. " 
However, as usual , these methods are in actuality pseudo-random number generators 
consisting of systems of deterministic difference equations. 
14 See Epstein (2006) for a discussion of the recursive function representation of ACE 
models. 
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equilibrium in the sense of condition (2) is possible, it is too restrictive 
to be of great interest. 
More interesting than this rarefied stationary-state form of balance are 
conceptions of equilibrium for the ACE Trading World that entail an 
"unchanging condition" with regard to more global world properties. 
Some of these possible conceptions are listed below. 
• The economy exhibits an unchanging carrying capacity, in the sense that 
it supports an unchanged number of solvent firms and viable consumers 
over time. 
• The economy exhibits continual market clearing, in the sense that 
demand equals supply in the markets for hash and beans over time. 
• The economy exhibits an unchanging structure, in the sense that the 
capacity levels (hence fixed costs) of the hash and bean firms are not 
changing over time. 
• The economy exhibits an unchanging belief pattern, in the sense that the 
firms' choice probability distributions for selection of their supply offers 
are not changing over time. 
• The economy exhibits an unchanging trade network, in the sense that 
who is trading with whom, and with what regularity, is not changing 
over time. 
• The economy exhibits a steady-state growth path, in the sense that the 
capacities and production levels of the firms and the consumption levels 
of the consumers are growing at constant rates over time. 
Finally, it is interesting to weaken further these conceptions of 
equilibria to permit approximate reflections of these various properties. 
Define an idealized reference path for the ACE Trading World to be a 
collection of state trajectories exhibiting one (or possibly several) of 
the above-listed global properties. For example, one might consider the set 
E* of all state trajectories exhibiting continual market clearing. For 
any given tolerance level T, define a T-neighborhood of the reference path 
E* to be the collection of all state trajectories whose distance from E* is 
within T for some suitably defined distance measure. 15 Given any initial 
specification for the ACE Trading World, one can then conduct multiple 
experimental runs using multiple pseudo-random number seed values to 
15 For example, a state trajectory might be said to be within distance r of E* if, for 
all sufficiently large tested T values, the discrepancy between period-T aggregate 
demand and period- T aggregate supply is less than r in absolute value for both hash 
and beans. 
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determine the (possibly zero) frequency with which the ACE Trading 
World enters and remains within this r-neighborhood. 
ACE MICROFOUNDATIONS FOR MACROECONOMICS 
Decentralized market economies are complex adaptive systems. Large 
numbers of micro agents engage repeatedly in local interactions, giving rise 
to macroregularities such as employment and growth rates, income 
distributions, market institutions, and social conventions. These macro-
regularities in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. 
The result is an intricate system of interdependent feedback loops con-
necting microbehaviors, interaction patterns, and macroregularities. 
This section briefly discusses how ACE modeling tools might facilitate 
the provision of empirically compelling microfoundations for macro-
economic systems taking the form of decentralized market economies. 
Six issues are highlighted: namely, constructive understanding; the essential 
primacy of survival; strategic rivalry; behavioral uncertainty and learning; 
procurement support; and the complex interactions among structural 
attributes, institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions. 16 The 
ACE Trading World outlined in the previous section is used to motivate 
key points. 
CONSTRUCTIVE UNDERSTANDING 
If you had to construct firms and consumers capable of prospering in 
a realistically rendered macroeconomy, how would you go about it? For 
example, in the ACE Trading World, how should firms co-learn to set their 
supply offers (production and price levels) over time, and how should 
consumers search across these supply offers? 
My macroeconomic students are generally intrigued but baffled when 
presented with this type of constructive exercise. They find it difficult to 
specify production, price, trade, and settlement processes driven solely by 
agent interactions, and they are unsure how to define a compelling testable 
conception of "equilibrium" for the resulting macroeconomic system. Yet 
the key issue is this: If economists cannot carry out this type of exercise, to 
what extent can we be said to understand the microsupport requirements 
for actual macroeconomies and the manner in which such macro-
economies might achieve an "unchanging condition"? 
16 See Tesfatsion (2006) for a more extended discussion of these issues. 
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ACE modeling permits economists and economics students to test 
their constructive understanding of economic processes essential for the 
functioning of actual real-world macroeconomies. 
The Essential Primacy of Survival 
The most immediate, dramatic, and humbling revelation flowing from the 
ACE modeling of macroeconomic systems is the difficulty of constructing 
economic agents capable of surviving over time, let alone prospering. 
When firms with fixed costs to cover are responsible for setting their own 
production and price levels, they risk insolvency. When consumers with 
physical requirements for food and other essentials must engage in a search 
process in an attempt to secure these essentials, they risk death. Every other 
objective pales relative to survival; it is lexicographically prior to almost 
every other consideration. 
ACE modeling permits economists to test their ability to construct firms 
and consumers capable of surviving and prospering in realistically rendered 
macroeconomies for which survival is by no means assured. 
Strategic Rivalry 
In macroeconomics organized on the basis of decentralized markets, each 
firm is necessarily in rivalry with other firms for scarce consumer dollars. 
For example, in the ACE Trading World, the production and price choices 
of the hash and bean firms are intrinsically linked through consumer 
budget constraints and preferences. A firm's production and price choices 
can help attract consumers for its own output by making its output 
relatively cheap, or by making its output relatively abundant and hence 
free of stock-out risk. In addition, the production and price choices of 
the firms producing one type of good can help to counter the relative 
preference of consumers for the other type of good. 
Similarly, each consumer is necessarily in rivalry with other consumers 
for potentially scarce produced goods. For example, in the ACE Trading 
World, the hash and bean firms currently offering the lowest prices can 
suffer stock-outs, hence a consumer formulating his/her demands condi-
tional on receiving these lowest posted prices has no actual guarantee 
that his/her demands will be realized. If a stock-out results in a con-
sumer's demand being rationed below his/her subsistence needs, preserv-
ing income for future purchases to secure these needs becomes a critical 
survival issue. 
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ACE modeling permits economists to explore the extent to which 
strategic behaviors by individual agents can potentially affect the 
determination of macroeconomic outcomes. 
Behavioral Uncertainty and Learning 
Tractability problems have made it difficult to incorporate individual 
learning behaviors in analytical macroeconomic models in an empirically 
compelling manner. In current macroeconomic theory, it is common to see 
the problem of learning short-circuited by the imposition of a rational 
expectations assumption. Rational expectations in its weakest form 
assumes that agents on average make optimal use of their information, 
in the sense that their subjective expectations coincide on average with 
objectively true expectations conditional on this information. Moreover, 
economists typically apply rational expectations in an even stronger form 
requiring optimal usage of information plus the inclusion in this 
information of all relevant information about the world. 
Whatever specific form it takes, the rational expectations assumption 
requires uncertainty to be ultimately calculable for all agents in terms of 
"objectively true" conditional probability distributions as an anchor for the 
commonality of beliefs. Expectations can differ across agents condition-
ing on the same information only by noise terms with no systematic 
relationship to this information, so that these noise terms wash out when 
average or "representative" expectations are considered. This rules out the 
dynamic study of strategic multi-agent environments such as the ACE 
Trading World in which a major source of uncertainty is behavioral 
uncertainty, that is, uncertainty regarding what actions other agents will 
take, and the focus is on interactive learning processes rather than on 
equilibrium per se. 
ACE modeling, particularly in parallel with human-subject experiments, 
could facilitate the study of behavioral uncertainty and learning in 
macroeconomic systems. 
Procurement Support 
In the Walrasian equilibrium model, the fictitious Walrasian Auctioneer 
pricing mechanism ensures buyers are efficiently matched with sellers at 
market clearing prices. In the real world, it is the procurement processes 
implemented by firms, consumers, and other agents actually residing 
within the world that drive economic outcomes. These procurement 
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processes must allow for a wide range of contingencies in order for 
economies to function properly. In particular, buyers and sellers must 
be able to continue on with their production, price, trade, and settlement 
activities even if markets fail to clear. 
The ACE Trading World illustrates the minimal types of scaffolding 
required to support orderly procurement in macroeconomic systems 
despite the occurrence of excess supply or demand. As seen in the previous 
section, this scaffolding includes insolvency protocol, price discovery 
protocol, profit allocation methods, and rationing methods. 
Interactions among Attributes, Institutions, and Behaviors 
Anyone who has had hands-on experience with the construction of ACE 
models, and hence with the specification of data and methods for multiple 
agents in a dynamic social setting, is sure to have encountered the following 
modeling conundrum: everything seems to depend on everything else. 
Consider, for example, the complicated feedbacks that arise even for 
the firms and consumers in the relatively simple ACE Trading World. It is 
generally not possible to conclude that a particular attribute will give a firm 
or consumer an absolute advantage over time, or that a particular method 
is optimally configured for a firm or consumer in an absolute sense. The 
advantage or optimality accruing to an attribute or method at any given 
time generally depends strongly on the current configuration of attributes 
and methods across firms and consumers as a whole. 
This modeling conundrum is not simply a methodological defect; rather, 
it is reflective of reality. Empirical evidence strongly indicates that structural 
attributes, behaviors, and institutional arrangements in real-world macro-
economic systems have indeed co-evolved. For example, McMillan (2002) 
uses a variety of case studies to argue that markets have both evolved from 
below and been designed from above, with necessary support from rules, 
customs, and other institutions that have co-evolved along with the 
markets. 
Given these complex interactions among attributes, institutions, and 
behaviors, and the growing ability to model these interactions computa-
tionally, it seems an appropriate time to re-examine the standards for good 
macroeconomic modeling. Taking the broad view of "agent" adopted in 
ACE modeling, institutions and structures as well as cognitive entities can 
be represented as recognizable and persistent bundles of data and methods 
that interact within a computationally constructed world. Indeed, as 
schematically depicted in Tables 9.1-9.4, the ACE Trading World includes 
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a structural agent (the world), institutional agents (markets for hash and 
beans), and cognitive agents (firms and consumers) . In short, agent-based 
tools provide tremendous opportunities for economists and other social 
scientists to increase the depth and breadth of the "representative agents" 
depicted in their models. 
A key outstanding issue is whether this ability to consider more 
comprehensive and empirically compelling taxonomies of representative 
agents will ultimately result in better predictive, explanatory, and 
exploratory models. For example, for the study of decentralized market 
economies, can the now-standard division of cognitive agents into 
producers, consumers, and government policymakers be usefully extended 
to include brokers, dealers, financial intermediaries, innovative entrepre-
neurs, and other forms of active market-makers? Similarly, can the 
traditional division of markets into perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, duopoly, oligopoly, and monopoly be usefully replaced with 
a broader taxonomy that better reflects the rich diversity of actual market 
forms as surveyed by McMillan (2002)? 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The defining characteristic of ACE models is their constructive grounding 
in the interactions of agents, broadly defined to include economic, social, 
biological, and physical entities. The state of a modeled system at each 
point in time is given by the data and methods of the agents that currently 
constitute the system. Starting from an initially specified system state, the 
motion of the state through time is determined by endogenously generated 
agent interactions. 
This agent-based dynamical description, cast at a less abstract level than 
standard equation-based economic models, increases the transparency 
and clarity of the modeling process. In particular, macroeconomists can 
proceed directly from empirical observations on the structural conditions, 
institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions of a real-world 
macroeconomic system to a computational modeling of the system. 
Moreover, the emphasis on process rather than on equilibrium solution 
techniques helps to ensure that empirical understanding and creative 
conjecture remain the primary prerequisites for useful macroeconomic 
model design. 
That said, ACE modeling is surely a complement, not a substitute, for 
analytical and statistical macroeconomic modeling approaches. As seen 
in the work by Sargent (1993), ACE models can be used to evaluate 
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macroeconomic theories developed using these more standard tools. Can 
agents indeed learn to coordinate on the types of equilibria identified in 
these theories and, if so, how? If there are multiple possible equilibria, 
which equilibrium (if any) will turn out to be the dominant attractor, and 
why? ACE models can also be used to evaluate the robustness of these 
theories to relaxations of their assumptions, such as common knowledge, 
rational expectations, and perfect capital markets. A key question in this 
regard is the extent to which learning, institutions, and evolutionary forces 
might substitute for the high degree of individual rationality currently 
assumed in standard macroeconomic theories. 
More generally, as elaborated by Axelrod (2006), ACE modeling tools 
could facilitate the development and experimental evaluation of integrated 
theories that build on theory and data from many different related fields. 
For example, using ACE modeling tools, macroeconomists can address 
growth, distribution, and welfare issues in a comprehensive manner 
encompassing a wide range of pertinent economic, social, political, and 
psychological factors. It is particularly intriguing to re-examine the broadly 
envisioned theories of earlier economists such as Adam Smith, Joseph 
Schumpeter, John Maynard Keynes, and Friedrich von Hayek, and to 
consider how these theories might now be more fully addressed m 
quantitative terms. 
Another potentially important aspect of the ACE methodology is 
pedagogical. ACE models can be implemented by computational 
laboratories that facilitate and encourage the systematic experimental 
exploration of complex economic processes. Students can formulate 
experimental designs to investigate interesting propositions of their own 
devising, with immediate feedback and with no original programming 
required. This permits teachers and students to take an inductive open-
ended approach to learning. Exercises can be assigned for which outcomes 
are not known in advance, giving students an exciting introduction to 
creative research. The modular form of the underlying computational 
laboratory software also permits students with programming backgrounds 
to modify and extend the laboratory features with relative ease. 17 
A number of requirements must be met, however, if the potential of 
ACE for scientific research is to be realized. ACE researchers need to focus 
on issues of importance for understanding economic processes. They need 
17 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/syl308.htm for an ACE course relying heavily 
on computational laboratory exercises to involve students creatively in the course 
materials. Annotated pointers to other ACE-related course preparations can be found 
at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/teachsyl.htm. 
202 Leigh Tesfatsion 
to construct models that capture the salient aspects of these issues, and to 
use these models to formulate clearly articulated theories regarding possible 
issue resolutions. They need to evaluate these theories systematically by 
means of multiple controlled experiments with captured seed values to 
ensure replicability by other researchers using possibly other platforms, and 
to report summaries of their theoretical findings in a transparent and 
rigorous form. Finally, they need to test their theoretical findings against 
real-world data in ways that permit empirically supported theories to 
cumulate over time, with each researcher's work building appropriately on 
the work that has gone before. 
Meeting all of these requirements is not an easy task. One possible way 
to facilitate the task is interdisciplinary collaboration. Recent efforts 
to advance collaborative research have been encouraging. For example, 
Barreteau (2003) reports favorably on efforts to promote a companion 
modeling approach to critical policy issues such as management of rene-
wable resources. The companion modeling approach is an iterative partici-
patory process involving stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and researchers 
from multiple disciplines in a repeated looping through a three-stage cycle: 
field work and data analysis, model development and implementation, and 
computational experiments. Agent-based modeling and role-playing 
games constitute important aspects of this process. The objective is the 
management of complex problems through a continuous learning process 
rather than the delivery of definitive problem solutions. 18 
Realistically, however, communication across disciplinary lines can be 
difficult, particularly if the individuals attempting the collaboration have 
little or no cross-disciplinary training. As elaborated by Axelrod and 
Tesfatsion (2006), economists and other social scientists interested in 
agent-based modeling should therefore ideally acquire basic programming, 
statistical, and mathematical skills together with suitable training in their 
desired application areas. 
18 See Janssen and Ostrom (2006) for applications of the companion modeling approach 
to the study of governance mechanisms for social-ecological systems. Koesrindartoto and 
Tesfatsion (2004) advocate and pursue a similar approach to the design of wholesale 
power markets. 
